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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
handed down three important constitutional decisions. Adolph Coors Co. v.
Bentsen' and Cannon v. City and County of Denver2 gave the Tenth Circuit an
opportunity to better define its approach to freedom of speech under the
First Amendment. The Coors case addressed whether a federal ban on
beer labels that announced alcohol content violated commercial speech
rights. 3 In Cannon, abortion protestors arrested for carrying signs that
read "The Killing Place" claimed the arrests violated their speech rights.
4
The case presented the Tenth Circuit with its first opportunity to apply
and define the 'fighting words' doctrine. The third case involved the nas-
cent constitutional right of familial association. In Griffin v. Strong,5 the
Tenth Circuit grounded the right in the Fourteenth Amendment and con-
sequently altered the analytical approach on which it had relied in earlier
cases.
6
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH: ADOLPh Coows Co. v. BEA'TsEA,
A. Background
In 1942, the Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen8 refused to rec-
ognize constitutional limitations on government's ability to prohibit
speech of a "purely commercial" nature.9 In spite of its categorical dispo-
sal of the issue, the Court spent the next thirty-five years retreating from
this holding. During this period, the Court published a series of decisions
suggesting that speech made for commercial purposes should receive
some protection. 10
1. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993). This case reached the Tenth Circuit first as Adolph
Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991), in which the court remanded for further
factual findings. References to this earlier case are Coors . References to Adolph Coors v.
Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993) are Coors II.
2. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 356.
4. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 869.
5. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. Id. at 1547.
7. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
8. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Valentine, an entrepreneur brought suit to enjoin the New
York City Police from enforcing a law which prohibited distribution of "commercial... ad-
vertising matter" in public places. Id. at 53 n.1.
9. Id. at 54. Oddly, the brief opinion (less than three pages) offered no supporting
precedential authority. For further discussion of the Court's cursory handling of Valentine,
see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71
TEx. L. Rv. 747, 754-58 (1993). Among other peculiarities, Kozinski and Banner note that
Valentine ranks among the most quickly decided cases in the Court's history. Id. at 757 (opin-
ion released 13 days after oral arguments and only 9 days after conference).
10. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (giving newspaper right to
publish advertisement for abortion referral service); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964) (upholding right of newspaper to publish paid political advertisement);
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The Court's retreat from Valentine culminated in the 1976 decision,
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,"1 in
which the Court found unconstitutional a state law that prohibited phar-
macists from advertising the prices of their drugs.1 2 The Court balanced
the governmental and private interests but stopped short of articulating an
actual test for determining when government action violated commercial
speech rights.' 3 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission,14 the Court resumed where it had left off in Virginia Citizens by
articulating a four-part test for determining when a challenged commer-
cial speech regulation is constitutional. First, the speech must "concern
lawful activity and not be misleading."15 Second, the government must be
asserting a "substantial" interest.16 If these two threshold tests are met,
then the court must, third, "determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted," and fourth, "whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.'
7
In a 1986 decision, the Court created some confusion with its treat-
ment of Central Hudson's third prong. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates. v.
Tourism Co.,' 8 the Court found that a ban on casino gambling advertise-
ments satisfied Central Hudson's third prong because the Puerto Rico Leg-
islature reasonably believed that the ban would directly advance its asserted
interest. 19 To some commentators, the Court's reliance on the reasonable
Commarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (assert-
ing the holding in Valentine had not "survived reflection");Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (recognizing that motion pictures are protected by the First Amend-
ment); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943) (invalidating city ordinance
that prohibited door-to-door solicitation for the purpose of distributing handbills as applied
to advertisements for a religious meeting). The Court distinguished most of these types of
cases from Valentine based on the additional presence of other clearly protectable interests.
See, e.g.,Jamison v. State, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (distinguishing distribution of commercial
handbills from Valentine because challenged handbills invited the purchase of religious
literature).
11. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Virginia Citizens put squarely before the Court the issue of
"whether speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction .. .lacks all
[constitutional] protection." Id. at 762 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
12. Id. at 770. For a discussion of the Court's retreat from Valentine leading up to its
decision in Virginia Citizens, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTrUrIONAL LAW § 12-15,
at 890-92 (2d ed. 1988). See also EDWIN P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 41-49 (1985).
13. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 762-70 (1976). The Court strongly suggested, however,
that commercial speech deserved less constitutional protections than other varieties. Id. at
770-73. For example, the Court said that false or misleading commercial speech would not
be protected. Id. at 771. For some of the policy concerns underlying the Court's insistence
on treating commercial speech differently than other types, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S 447, 456 (1978) (fear that giving equal protection to commercial speech
would ultimately dilute the traditional protections afforded non-commercial speech).
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, a public utility company challenged a regu-
lation that prohibited it from advertising to promote the use of electricity. Id. at 558-61.
15. Id. at 566.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
19. Id. at 341-42. The ban in question only affected advertising aimed at residents of
Puerto Rico, not tourists. Id. at 330. The Court found that the Puerto Rico Legislature's
asserted interest of protecting its citizens from the harmful effects of gambling was substan-
tial, thus satisfying the second prong of the Central Hudson test. Id. at 341.
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belief standard signalled the beginning of a more deferential approach
toward government limitations on commercial speech.
2 0
Recently, the Court indicated that Central Hudson's third prong still
provided significant constitutional protection to commercial speech. In
Edenfleld v. Fane,2 1 the Court held that to satisfy the third prong of Central
Hudson the government must show that a challenged restriction "will in
fact alleviate [the recited harms] to a material degree."2 2 The Court em-
phasized that challenged legislation could not be based on mere legislative
"speculation."2 3 The Edenfield decision directly contradicted Posadas with
respect to Central Hudson's third prong, but the Court made no effort to
reconcile the two decisions.
B. Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen: 24 The Tenth Circuit Gives Strong
Protection to Commercial Speech
In 1987, Adolph Coors Company ("Coors") made a request to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") seeking approval to
incorporate the alcohol content of its beer into advertisements and label-
ing.25 Pursuant to 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2) and (f) (2) (1988), the BATF re-
fused to grant the approval. 26 Congress enacted the challenged bans to
prevent malt beverage brewers from engaging in "strength wars" over the
alcohol content of their beers.2 7 Coors sued, claiming unconstitutional
infringement of its speech in violation of the First Amendment.
28
Coors's case against the BATF came before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals for the first time as Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady.29 The court of ap-
peals remanded the case to the district court because genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the challenged regulation "directly ad-
20. See Terrence Leahy, A Game of Chance: Commercial Speech After Posadas, A.B.A J., Sept.
1, 1988, at 58, 60. More recently, the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test has come under
undoubted revisionary weakening. In the 1989 case, Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989), the Supreme Court held that the fourth prong of the test only requires that there be
a reasonable "fit" between the legislative means and its asserted goal. Id. at 480. The Court
rejected the idea that Central Hudson requires that the challenged regulation be "the least
restrictive means" available. Id.; see Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 ("[i]f the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction ..., the excessive restrictions
cannot survive"). One critic has argued that, taken together, the decisions in Posadas and Fox
effectively lower the standard of review in commercial speech cases from intermediate scru-
tiny to a rational basis review. See Albert P. MauroJr., Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox:
A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1931, 1951-54 (1992).
21. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
22. Id. at 1800.
23. Id.
24. 2 F.3d 355 (loth Cir. 1993) (Coors I).
25. Id. at 356. Coors's request to make public the alcohol content of its beer stemmed
from its desire to end its reputation as a brewer of weak beer. Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady,
944 F.2d 1543, 1549 (10th Cir. 1991) (Coors 1), appeal after remand, 2 F.3d 355 (1993).
26. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 356. Section 205(e) (2) prohibits malt beverage brewers from in-
cluding in their labeling "statements of, or statements likely to be considered statements of,
alcohol content of malt beverages." 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1988). Section 205(f)(2) pros-
cribes the same statements from inclusion in advertising. 27 U.S.C. § 205(f)(2) (1988).
27. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 356.
28. Id.
29. 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991) (Coors 1), appeal after remand, 2 F.3d 355 (1993).
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vance[d] the government's asserted interest.., and whether the complete
prohibition of such advertising result[ed] in a 'reasonable fit' between the
legislature's goal and the means chosen to reach it."30 On remand, the
district court found the ban constitutional with respect to advertising but
unconstitutional in its prohibition against' including statements of alcohol
content in labeling.3 1 The trial court concluded that the labeling ban
failed the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson in that it neither di-
rectly advanced nor reasonably fit the legitimate government goal of
preventing strength wars.3 2 The Government appealed.
The Government placed the Supreme Court's holding in PosadaS3 at
the heart of its appeal. The Government argued that as long as Congress
reasonably believed the labeling ban would help prevent strength wars, the
ban satisfied Central Hudson's third prong.3 4 After the Government filed
its appellate brief, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Eden-
field v. Fane.3 5 This development gave the Tenth Circuit the opportunity
to determine unequivocally the degree to which it would protect commer-
cial speech.
36
The court of appeals did not hesitate in asserting its preference for
the decision in Edenfield over the one in Posadas. After noting with ap-
proval the Supreme Court's decision in Edenfield, the court said that the
Government had the burden of showing that the labeling ban "in fact alle-
viate[s]" the harm of strength wars "to a material degree."
3 7
The court of appeals went on to discuss why the labeling ban did not
directly advance the legitimate government goal of preventing strength
wars. The court noted that Coors only requested permission to publish
purely factual information, as opposed to the kinds of descriptive labeling
devices that would arguably lead to strength wars.
3 8
30. Id. at 1554. In other words, the court of appeals found that issues of fact remained
with respect to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.
31. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 357.
32. Id. The district court held that the ban failed to satisfy the first and second prongs
of the Central Hudson test.
33. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
34. Coors 11, 2 F.3d at 358.
35. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
36. In Coors I, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's language strongly suggested
that it favored a more stringent reading of Central Hudson's third prong than the Supreme
Court had adopted in Posadas. Focusing on the Supreme Court's original articulation in
Central Hudson, the court asserted that "[t]here must be an 'immediate connection' between
the prohibition and the government's asserted end." Coors , 944 F.2d at 1549 (quoting Cen-
tral Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569). However, until Edenfiedd Posadas was the Supreme Court's most
recent interpretation of Central Hudson's third prong. Under Posadas, the government's argu-
ment appeared sound.
37. Coors 11, 2 F.3d at 357 (quoting Edenfie/d, 113 S. Ct. at 1800).
38. Id. at 358-59. Part of the Government's argument relied on its experiences in the
relatively small malt liquor industry. See id. at 358 n.4 (malt liquors represent three percent
of total market). Malt liquor is a generic description used to designate those malt beverages
with the highest alcohol content. Id. It has been the BATF's experience that consumers of
malt liquor favor it precisely because of this attribute. Accordingly, brewers have often tried
illegally to advertise and label their malt liquors in a manner that is strongly suggestive of




The court then pointed to three reasons why the Government's ban
on purely factual labeling would not achieve its asserted goal. First, evi-
dence elicited at trial suggested that strength wars did not pose a problem
in states or other countries that required alcohol content labeling.
39 Sec-
ond, according to undisputed evidence, American brewers had no inten-
tion of increasing the alcohol content of their beers, because increased
alcohol detracts from taste and increases calories, both of which concern
American consumers.40 The court based its third reason on the fact
Coors' request to publish the alcohol content of its beers was motivated by
its reputation as a brewer of weak beers. 4 1 The court of appeals reasoned
that if the BATF permitted Coors to publish this information on its labels,
any incentive Coors might have to strengthen its beers would disappear.
4 2
In light of these weaknesses, the court of appeals found the Govern-
ment's assertion that the labeling was necessary to prevent strength wars
"based on mere speculation and conjecture." 43 Continuing in the lan-
guage of Edenfield, the court said the Government had failed "to show that
the prohibition advances the Government's interest in a direct and mate-
rial way." 44 The court of appeals concluded that the challenged ban did
not satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson and therefore unconstitution-
ally infringed on Coors' First Amendment rights.
45
C. Analysis
One of the most pervasive themes in the debate over how much pro-
tection commercial speech should receive has been the tension between
government's role as a protector of its citizens and the opposing notion
that consumers in a free market economy should be able to make their
own decisions as to what is in their best interest. 46 The test devised by the
39. Id. at 358. Section 205(e) (2) makes an exception for when alcohol content labeling
is required by state law. See 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1988).
40. Coors I 2 F.3d at 359.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
44. Coors II, 2 F.3d at 359 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 359 n.6.
46. Nowhere in commercial speech commentary is this theme more evident than in the
debate over restrictions on cigarette advertising. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much
Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205 (1988) (arguing
that cigarette advertising can and should be constitutionally banned); Remarks by Michael Gart-
ner; 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1173, 1178-79 (1988) (arguing that there should be no limitations on
commercial speech, including cigarette advertising). Collateral to the paternalism/con-
sumer choice theme is the issue of whether commercial speech is the type of speech the
authors of the First Amendment intended to protect. The Supreme Court tackled this issue
in Virginia Citizens with the following reasoning:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of
our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information
is indispensable .... And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation resources in
a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opin-
ions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public
1994]
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Supreme Court in Central Hudson provided a balanced approach to this
tension. Since Central Hudson, the Supreme Court has allowed this bal-
ance to slip in favor of government regulation.
4 7
In recognizing that commercial speech is entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, the Supreme Court did not hold that commercial speech
"is wholly undifferentiable from other forms."48 Despite its emphasis on
the public's interest in being well informed, the Court asserted that com-
mercial speech should not be entitled to the same protections as non-com-
mercial varieties.49 The justifications for this distinction were well-
founded. Even though consumers may be seen as the end beneficiaries of
commercial speech protection, 50 the demand for this protection is primar-
ily driven by corporate profit motives. This characteristic, combined with
consumer reliance on offered information, creates a serious threat of
harm if the government is not able to regulate commercial speech. Part of
the government's role in this respect is to keep the commercial informa-
tion given to consumers from becoming disinformation. As the Supreme
Court asserted in Central Hudson,5 1
[t] he First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently,
there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public
about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of commu-
nication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.5
2
The paternalistic role of government, however, is tempered by the
libertarian notion that citizens of a democratic society should be free to
make enlightened decisions as "to their own best interests."53 A founda-
tional principle captured by the Court's rationale in Virginia Citizens is that
consumers are the ultimate profiteers from commercial speech protec-
tion. It should be noted that the plaintiffs in Virginia Citizens were consum-
decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information
does not serve that goal.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)(citations
omitted).
47. See Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); see also Mauro, supra note 20.
48. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
49. Id. Distinguishing between speech that is commercial and other varieties is a com-
plete issue in itself. The Court in Virginia Citizens said that the difference is a matter of
.commonsense," id., a means of distinction on which the Court continued to rely. See
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). For a brief discussion of this
issue, see TRiBE, supra note 12, at 894.
50. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
51. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
52. Id. at 563 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also shown a concern for the
diluent effect that might occur from treating commercial and non-commercial speech
equally.
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than sub-
ject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded com-
mercial speech a limited measure of protection. ...
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
53. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 770.
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ers of prescription drugs, not sellers.54 These consumers claimed "they
would greatly benefit if the prohibition were lifted and advertising freely
allowed."55 The Court emphasized that a "particular consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information" is often greater "than his in-
terest in the day's most urgent political debate."56 When the Supreme
Court articulated the test in Central Hudson, it recognized that govern-
ment's ability to regulate commercial speech should be carefully restricted
to insure that consumers' interest in self-determination is protected.
57
The third prong of the Central Hudson test now acts as the primary reposi-
tory of this protection. 58 According to the Court's decision in Central Hud-
son, this third prong requires direct advancement of the substantial
government interest.59
When the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided Adolph
Coors Co. v. Bentsen,6 0 the opposing parties presented conflicting Supreme
Court precedent in support of their arguments. The government argued
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,6 1 a decision that offered a
weakened version of Central Hudson's third prong. Coors countered by
arguing that the more recent Edenfield v. Fane6 2 decision reinvigorated the
Central Hudson test. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court made no efforts to
distinguish its decision in Edenfield from the irreconcilable position in
Posadas. The Tenth Circuit had a choice between two interpretations of
the law. It rightfully chose to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Edenfield,
and consequently gave commercial speech the protection that consumers
deserve.
54. Id. at 753. The consumers challenged the validity of a state law forbidding licensed
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. Id. at 749-50.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 763.
57. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-66.
58. Since the Court's decision in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), which
held that Central Hudson's fourth prong requires only a reasonable "fit" between the legisla-
tive means and the asserted goal, the third prong of the test is arguably left as the only
significant check on government regulation of commercial speech. Most commentators
agree that Fox severely weakened the fourth prong. See Mauro, supra note 20, at 1951-54;
Todd J. Locher, Comment, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox:
Cutting Back on Commercial Speech Standards, 75 IowA L. REv. 1335 (1990); David F. McGowan,
Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 378-80 (1990); David
Rownd, Comment, Muting the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Board of Trustees of the State Uni-
versity of New York v. Fox, 38 WAsH. U. J. U". & CoNTEMP. L. 275 (1990).
59. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
60. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
61. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
62. 113 S. Ct. 1729 (1993).
1994]
DENVER UN/VERS/TY LAW REVIEW
II. THE FIGHTING WoRDs DOCTRINE: CANNON V. C7YANlD COUN-Y OF
A. Background
A fundamental and settled principle of constitutional law declares
that government cannot limit speech because of its content.64 This princi-
ple, however, is not absolute. There are circumstances in which the
Supreme Court has given its approval to content-based limitations on
speech.65 In its 1940 decision Cantwell v. Connecticut,66 the Supreme Court
set the foundation for such an exception when it said that "[r]esort to epi-
thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of infor-
mation or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as
a criminal act would raise no question under [the Constitution]."67
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,6 8 the Supreme Court borrowed this
language from Cantwell to support its decision denying Constitutional pro-
tection to words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." 69 The Court termed such utter-
ances "fighting words."70 The Court reasoned, " [i] t has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
63. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
64. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
65. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (untruthful or misleading commercial speech not protected); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity not constitutionally protected); Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952) (upholding state stature that prohibited libel);
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (speech that is an "incitement to riot" not
constitutionally protected).
66. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
67. Id. at 309-10. In Cantwel a man was convicted for a breach of the peace for his
solicitation of people on a public street to listen to a phonograph that contained strong
verbal attacks on Catholicism, the religion of the listeners. Id. at 308-09. The phonograph
provoked the listeners to near-violent reactions. Id. In reversing the defendant's conviction,
the Court found that the defendant's conduct involved:
no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional dis-
courtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we find only an effort to persuade a
willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what
Cantwell, however misguided others may think him, conceived to be true religion.
Id. at 310.
68. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
69. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted). In Chaplinsky, the Court upheld the conviction of a
man who called a police officer "a God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist." Id. at
569.
The quoted statement of the law has been interpreted as articulating a two-part disjunc-
tive test. See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-8, at 837-39. The Court based its decision in Chaplinsky
on the tendency of the arrested speaker's words to "cause a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 574. The part of the test that denies protection to those words "which by their
very utterance inflict injury" has never been the basis of a Supreme Court decision to validate
speech suppression. Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for
its Interment, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1129, 1137 (1993).
70. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."
7 1
The Court's decision in Chaplinsky established what is known as the
"fighting words doctrine."72 Prior to this survey period, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had not taken an opportunity to
apply this exception to content-based limitations on speech.
73
B. Cannon v. City and County of Denver:7 4 The Tenth Circuit Definitively
Applies the Fighting Words Doctrine
The issues in Cannon arose when police arrested two abortion protes-
tors for carrying signs that read "The Killing Place" on the sidewalk in
front of an abortion clinic.75 The man and woman arrested sued the two
arresting officers under § 1983 claiming that the arrests violated their First
Amendment right to free speech. 76 The officers based their defense on
qualified immunity, claiming that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
were not clearly established at the time of the arrests. 7 7 They argued that
signs reading "The Killing Place" constituted fighting words and were,
therefore, not entitled to First Amendment protection.
78
71. Id. (citing ZECHARIA CHAFEE., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (5th prtg.
1941)).
72. See Beth C. Boswell-Odum, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine and Racial Speech on Cam-
pus, 33 S. TEX. L. REv. 261 (1992).
73. The Tenth Circuit has mentioned fighting words in three cases prior to the survey
period, but in all three the court discussed the doctrine briefly and only in passing. See
United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1989);Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 994
(1986), aft'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Fisher v. Walker, 464 F.2d 1147, 1160 (1972).
74. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 869. The officers charged the plaintiffs with disturbing the peace, and the city
later dismissed the charges. Id. The day of the arrests was only one of many in an ongoing
protest against the abortion services of the Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood clinic at the
corner of East 20th Avenue and Vine Street in Denver. Id.; Ann Carnahan, Protestors, Denver
Settle, RocKv MTN. NEWS, Sept. 29, 1993, at 4A. Police had arrested one of the plaintiffs
several months before for assaulting a patient. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 869. Officer Ryan-
Fairchild, one of the defendants, was an off-duty police officer whom the clinic had hired as a
private security guard. Id. On the day of the arrests, Officer Ryan-Fairchild had to restrain a
man who became incensed by the plaintiffs' signs. Id. The other officer, Officer Baca, was
on duty and became involved in the arrest when he stopped to monitor the situation. Id. It
is not clear from the court's presentation of the facts if the signs in question had always been
part of the protests, but their content clearly provoked the arrests. Id. at 871 ("the activity
which the police found objectionable was not the picketing itself but the specific content of
the protestors' signs").
76. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 869. Section 1983 provides a federal tort remedy when persons
acting under color of state law deprive a plaintiff of a federally protected right. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988); Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
77. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 871. A government official who is performing a discretionary
duty is exempt from liability for civil damages under § 1983 so long as her conduct "does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
78. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 872. The police officers arrested the plaintiffs with the under-
standing that Denver CountyJudge Soja had ruled that words such as "killer" would be con-
sidered "fighting words." Id. at 869. Officer Ryan-Fairchild heard of this supposed ruling
from another officer, Officer Yates, who had spoken with Judge Soja about abortion protes-
tors and their legal rights. Id. at 869, 875 n.8. In fact, Judge Soja made no such ruling. Id. at
875 n.8. In the conversation on which Officer Ryan-Fairchild relied, Judge Soja was not
speaking in his official judicial capacity but merely giving some informal advice to Officer
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The federal district court granted the defendants qualified immu-
nity.79 The plaintiffs' appealed the issue of whether they had a clearly
established constitutional right to carry signs reading "The Killing Place"
at the time of their arrests. 80 A finding that the plaintiffs did have a clearly
established right would remove the defendants' qualified immunity.8 1
Resolving this issue required the court of appeals to determine whether
the plaintiffs' signs fell within the definition of fighting words. If the de-
fendant officers could make "a showing sufficient to establish the fighting
words defense,"8 2 then the plaintiffs' rights would be judged as not clearly
established and the grant of qualified immunity would be upheld.
The court of appeals first turned its attention to the Supreme Court
cases in an effort to synthesize the prior holdings into its own cogent state-
ment of the law. The court looked for guidance from its Chaplinsky v. New
HampshireM3 decision and three subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
84
From Chaplinsky the court of appeals found the idea that fighting words
"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas."8 5 Looking at Cohen, the
court emphasized that the alleged fighting words must be "directed to the
person of the hearer."8 6 From Terminiello and Feiner the court of appeals
borrowed the notion that it is not enough for the suspect speech to arouse
"some people to anger."87 The speaker must exceed the "bounds of argu-
ment or persuasion" and undertake an "incitement."88 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that "[f] ighting words are thus epithets (1) directed at the per-
son of the hearer, (2) inherently likely to cause a violent reaction, and (3)
playing no role in the expression of ideas."
89
Yates, who then relayed the conversation to Officer Ryan-Fairchild. Id. at 869, 875 n.8. Judge
Soja told Officer Yates that there may be times when protestors' expressions could rise to the
level of 'fighting words,' but his informal comments fell short of a ruling. See id. at 875 n.8.
Officers Ryan-Fairchild and Baca raised a second defense based on their good faith reli-
ance on "a legal ruling or advice." Id. at 871; see V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming Dept. of Envt'l
Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (good faith reliance on legal advice can create
an "extraordinary circumstance" under which a defendant "should not be imputed with
knowledge of an admittedly clearly established right") (quotation marks and citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). This aspect of Cannon did not involve a constitutional
issue and is not addressed by this survey.
79. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 870. The district court granted summary judgment on the fed-
eral claims. It then used its discretionary power to dismiss without prejudice the plaintiffs's
collateral state tort claims. Id.
80. See id. at 870.
81. See id. at 870-71; see also supra note 77 (statement of law on qualified immunity).
82. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 872.
83. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
84. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing the conviction of a man ar-
rested for wearing ajacket that read "Fuck the Draft" in a county courthouse); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding conviction of man who encouraged violent uprising in
support of civil rights); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (reversing conviction of
man under city ordinance which allowed conviction for speech which "stirred people to an-
ger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest").
85. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 873 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
86. Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (footnote omitted)
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The court of appeals applied each leg of this tri-partite test to the facts
in Cannon and accordingly found that the plaintiffs' signs did not rise to
the level of fighting words. First, the court found that the plaintiffs did
not focus their signs on a particular person, but instead aimed their pro-
tests at the activities of everyone involved in the abortion process. 90 Sec-
ond, the court declared that although the signs tended to be offensive to
people entering the clinic, they were not "inherently likely to cause an
immediate breach of the peace."9 1 Finally, the court found the signs
served a role in the dialogue of ideas, because they asserted one of the
anti-abortion movement's fundamental principles-that abortion is
murder.
9 2
Based on this analysis, the court of appeals found the plaintiffs had a
clearly established constitutional right to employ signs that read "The Kill-
ing Place" in their lawful picketing of the abortion clinic.93 The court
reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded the
case back to the district court.
94
C. Analysis
Cannon v. City and County of Denver95 presented the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals with its first attempt to apply the fighting words doc-
trine. 96 Alleged fighting words most often arise in extremely controversial
situations, and the facts in Cannon held true to this stereotype. The abor-
tion debate has become one of the most divisive issues in American soci-
ety.97 Clinic protests serve as the front lines of this debate, and these
protests often become the sources of the most acrimonious exchanges be-
tween abortion rights opponents and advocates. 98
In Cannon, one of the court's unarticulated tasks required it to take a
disinterested approach to the political controversy underlying the issues9 9
before it. The court rose to this task100 and articulated a narrowly tailored
test in order to avoid placing unnecessary restrictions on the important
role of controversial speech in American society.
According to the Tenth Circuit, fighting words are "epithets (1) di-




93. See id. at 874.
94. Id. at 879.
95. 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
96. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
97. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (dis-
cussing two centuries of the abortion debate).
98. See generally Clinic Blockades: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of
the House Comm'n on the Judiciay, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (taking testimony on who
prevails when competing constitutional rights are asserted in the abortion debate).
99. The Court focused on the issues of fighting words, immunity, and the standards for
summary judgment. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 867.
100. Throughout its opinion, the court avoided any comment on the propriety of the
plaintiffs' conduct. Neither did it indulge in any language indicative of its stance on the
abortion issue.
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reaction, and (3) playing no role in the expression of ideas." 10 1 Taken
individually, none of these three elements added anything new to the
fighting words doctrine. 10 2 Never before, however, had the Supreme
Court combined all three requirements into a precise conjunctive test.'
0 3
The result of the Tenth Circuit's holding is that only a very narrow
type of public expression is left unprotected by the First Amendment.
While each prong of the test plays a part in protecting speech, the require-
ment that the challenged speech play "no role in the expression of ideas"
is clearly the farthest reaching. The potential of words, even obscene and
offensive words, to contribute toward the expression of ideas is immense.
Such contributions can be achieved even when a word's literal meaning
adds little to the exposition of ideas. Aside from a detached definitional
meaning, words can also convey an emotional quality that "may often be
the more important element of the overall message."
10 4
A twist on the facts in Cannon shows the value of emotion-laden
words. For example, suppose the defendants arrested the plaintiffs, not
for carrying signs, but for telling a prospective clinic client, 'You're a
damned murderer!" In this instance, the plaintiffs' conduct is undoubt-
edly "directed at the person of the hearer,"' 0 5 as set forth in the Cannon
fighting words test. Assume, arguendo, that the statement is inherently
violence provoking, thus satisfying the second prong of the court of ap-
peals' test. The question then becomes whether the epithet still plays a
role in the expression of ideas. The statement undeniably makes a pas-
sionate and "forceful presentation of the anti-abortion viewpoint."10 6 The
words are raw and crude, but they convey an emotive element that would
be difficult to achieve with niceties, an emotive element to which speech is
entitled.
Controversial speech, while it may be provocative, serves important
functions in our society. As the Supreme Court noted in Terminiello v.
Chicago, speech often "invite[s] dispute"10 7 and "stirs people to anger.'
0 8
This is especially true if the speech relates to a politically controversial
issue, but these results should not be thwarted. By giving broad protection
to controversial speech, despite creating strong reactions in listeners,
101. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 873.
102. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
103. Although the Supreme Court's articulation of the fighting words doctrine has never
been as precise as that used by the Tenth Circuit in Cannon, the Court has consistently used a
very narrow definition of fighting words. Boswell-Odum, supra note 72, at 270-75. In the half
century since the Court decided Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), it has
not upheld another conviction under the fighting words doctrine. Boswell-Odum, supra note
72, at 274. In fact, some commentators suggest the fighting words doctrine exists in the
present only as a historical remnant that is no longer employed except perhaps in a constitu-
tionally impermissive manner. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH U.
L.Q. 531, 580 (1980); Thomas F. Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That "--Fighting
Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1975).
104. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
105. Cannon, 998 F.2d at 873.
106. Id.




courts ensure that political dialogue is a true exchange of views. A demo-
cratic form of government requires leaving the public forum open to all
ideas, no matter how controversial or how offensive. 10 9 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit implicitly recognized in Cannon, the continued health of the Ameri-
can democratic system is inextricably bound to the ability of American
citizens to vent their frustrations, their dislikes, and their disagreements.
The court of appeal's narrow interpretation of the fighting words doctrine
helps protect speech that often makes the most poignant contribution to
the highly-valued exchange of ideas.
III. THE RIGHT OF FAMILIAL ASSOCIATION: GRIFIN V. STRON G1 1 0
A. Background
The right of familial association is relatively new to constitutional ju-
risprudence. 1 11 This new constitutional right has several distinguishing
hallmarks. First, the right is virtually always asserted in the context of a
§ 1983112 action. 113 Second, and most importantly, a cause of action is
created in a person who is not the primary target of state conduct.'1 4 Typ-
ically, a plaintiff asserts that a state actor's conduct toward her family mem-
ber impermissibly interfered with her relationship with that family
member.' 15 The right of familial association is similar to the common law
tort claim of loss of consortium, because the plaintiff is related to the pri-
mary victim. t1 6
109. Alexander Meiklejohn, one of the founders of this position, makes the point more
eloquently than I:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass judg-
ment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise
ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as
well as safe, un-American as well as American. Just so far, at any point, the citizens
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or
doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutila-
tion of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the
necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Rea-
son in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that pub-
lic issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1979).
110. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
111. See Wrigley v. Greanias, 842 F.2d 955, 957 n.3 (7th Cir.) (noting that most familial
association cases were decided since 1980), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
113. See Michael S. Bogren, The Constitutionalization of Consortium Claims, 68 U. DET. L.
REv. 479, 479 (1991). There do not appear to be any published decisions involving the right
of familial association that arose outside of the § 1983 context.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.), (upholding grant of
summary judgment against daughter who sued police chief for failing to prevent the suicide
of her father while he was in protective custody), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 113 (1992). Different
types of fact patterns have given rise to familial association claims. See, e.g., Hameetman v.
City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing fireman's claim that city
ordinance requiring him to live within city limits interfered with his filial relationship with his
hyperkinetic son whose well-being required that he stay in a familiar environment).
116. See Bogren, supra note 112, at 479.
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The circuits are split over the recognition of the right of familial asso-
ciation. The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are the leading propo-
nents of the right,1 17 while the First Circuit is its most steadfast
opponent.1 18
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of a
state law requiring the United States Jaycees to accept women as regular
members. 119 In distinguishing the rights asserted by the Jaycees from
those relationships protected under the Constitution, the Court empha-
sized that "[f] amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments
and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs
but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life."
120
A year later, in Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners,12 1 the Tenth
Circuit used the Court's reasoning in Roberts122 as a springboard for its
decision to recognize the constitutionally protected right of "familial
association." 
12 3
In Trujillo, a woman and her daughter sought relief under § 1983,124
claiming that the wrongful death of their son and brother, Richard Tru-
jillo, while in custody at the Santa Fe County jail, deprived them of their
constitutional right of familial association. 125 The plaintiffs claimed that
this right existed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 126 After
holding that the plaintiffs had standing to assert this claim, 127 the court of
appeals declared that the Trujillos "had constitutionally protected inter-
ests in their relationship with their son and brother."
128
117. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1985);
Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653-55 (9th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1243-50 (7th Cir. 1984).
118. See, e.g., Manarite, 957 F.2d at 960; Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7-9 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991); Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 7-10 (1st Cir. 1986).
119. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Roberts, the Jaycees
argued that the application of the act denied its members the freedom of association pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 617-18.
120. Id. at 619-20. TheJaycees raised two separate constitutional claims: freedom of asso-
ciation as a personal liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment and freedom to associate, as a
guarantee of the rights to speech, assembly, and religion, under the First Amendment. See id.
at 617-18. The Court analyzed these claims individually. Id. at 618-29.
121. 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985).
122. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
123. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188. The language and reasoning that the court of appeals
borrowed in Trujillo comes from the section in Roberts in which the Supreme Court analyzed
the Fourteenth Amendment claim, freedom of association, as a personal liberty interest. See
id. at n.4.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
125. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1187.
126. Id. The Trujillos' complaint apparently relied upon the First Amendment for its
substantive foundation and the Fourteenth Amendment to apply this claim to the state ac-
tion. Id. at 1188 n.4. Importantly, the court of appeals liberally read the complaint "as an
assertion of the [Fourteenth Amendment] liberty interest discussed in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees." Id.
127. Id. at 1187-88.
128. Id. at 1189. The court of appeals cited to a number of decisions in support of this
declaration. See id. at 1188-89. One of the sub-issues presented by these cases was whether a
liberty interest in familial association should be extended beyond the parental relationship to
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The court of appeals then turned to the issue of what conduct would
constitute a deprivation of this right. Having recognized a nascent right,
the court found itself without a test for when this right had been violated.
The court opted to look to other well established constitutional protec-
tions for some guidance.1 2 9 It found a satisfactory analytical analogy in
the freedom of expressive association protected by the First Amend-
ment.'3 0 Based on this analogy, the court of appeals concluded that for a
plaintiff to establish a deprivation of the right of familial association, a
showing must be made that the defendant had the "intent to interfere
with a particular relationship."131
Because the plaintiffs in Trujillo failed to allege intent in the com-
plaint, the court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the
claims.13 2 The court refined its holding by stating that any intent which
the defendants might have had with respect to the harms done to the
victim could not be transferred to establish the intent to deprive the plain-
tiffs of their constitutional rights.13 3 In the court's words, "[t]he alleged
conduct by the State, however improper or unconstitutional with respect
to the son, will work an unconstitutional deprivation of the freedom of
intimate association only if the conduct was directed at that right."'
3 4
Until the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals followed
Trujillo faithfully. It continued to insist that the defendant's conduct be
intentionally directed at the plaintiff.13 5 In the process, the court of ap-
peals failed to address an important issue left open by its decision in Tru-
jillo, where it categorized the plaintiffs' claim as a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest,'3 6 while formulating a test borrowed from First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.13 7 This dichotomous treatment created an unan-
swered question: what is the constitutional source for the right of familial
association?' 3 8 The importance of this question is not merely academic.
include sibling relationships. Id. The Seventh Circuit, although it was among the first cir-
cuits to recognize a right of familial association, refuses to extend this right to siblings. See
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1245-48 (7th Cir. 1984). The Tenth Circuit de-
clined to follow this lead. Refusing to let other intimate relationships go unprotected, the
court of appeals in Trujillo recognized a right of familial association in Richard Trujillo's
sister. Trujillo, 786 F.2d at 1189. The court even suggested that the types of intimate relation-
ships falling under this protection would not be limited to familial ones. Id. at 1189 n.5. The
Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to recognize a protected liberty interest in dating. See
Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1542-44 (11th Cir. 1984).
129. See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189-90.
130. Id. at 1189 (stating "that freedom of expressive association provides the most appro-
priate analogy for freedom of intimate association").




135. See, e.g., Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1990).
136. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188 n.4.
137. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
138. See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1546 (10th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit's
failure to resolve this issue created confusion and inconsistency among courts who looked to
Trujillo for guidance. For example, the Fourth Circuit has cited Trujillo for the proposition
that the right of familial association arises out of the First Amendment in Rucker v. Harford
County, 946 F.2d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992), while the
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The typical liberty interest test under the Fourteenth Amendment is mark-
edly different than the intent-based test applied by the Tenth Circuit in
Trujillo. According to the United States Supreme Court, determining
whether an individual's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests have
been violated requires balancing the asserted liberty interest against the
governmental interests.
1 3 9
B. Griffin v. Strong'
40
In 1986, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff James Strong arrested
Steven Griffin for alleged sexual abuse of a child. 14 1 Mr. Griffin's wife,
Dorothy, filed a § 1983 complaint alleging that Officer Strong violated her
constitutional rights by the manner in which he conducted the investiga-
tion and arrest of her husband.1 42 The jury returned special verdicts in
favor of Mrs. Griffin, finding that Officer Strong had violated her rights of
familial association.1 4 3 Officer Strong appealed. He argued that the jury's
finding was not sufficiently supported by the evidence.14 4 His appeal
raised important unresolved questions about the right of familial associa-
tion, one concerning its constitutional foundations and a second concern-
ing the proper test for determining when the right of familial association
has been violated.
The court began its analysis by exploring the jurisprudential history of
the right of familial association. Judge Ebel, writing for the court, quickly
returned to the issue left open by Trujillo and refused to continue the
court's reliance on the analogy it drew between the First Amendment
right of expressive association and the right of familial association. In-
stead, the court retreated from its reasoning in Trujillo and found that "the
Seventh Circuit contends that Trujillo based this same right on the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit itself has not been
immune to this confusion. In Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445
(10th Cir. 1990), the court of appeals perfunctorily suggested that Trujillo established a First
Amendment right. Id. at 1448.
139. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1982).
140. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
141. Griffin v. Strong, 739 F. Supp. 1496, 1497-98 (D. Utah 1990), rev. 'd, 983 F.2d 1540
(10th Cir. 1993). Thejury in the criminal trial convicted Mr. Griffin of two counts of sexual
abuse of a child, but two years later the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 1498 (citing State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988)). The Utah Court of Appeals found that of two confessions Mr. Griffin gave to
Officer Strong, one was given under coercion and the second was given without a valid waiver
of his Miranda rights. Id. (citing Griffin, 754 P.2d at 971).
142. Id. For the alleged conduct on which Dorothy Griffin based her claim, see infra
notes 155-59 and accompanying text. Mrs. Griffin also sued a social worker, Dennis Gale, but
because the jury found Gale not liable for any of the plaintiff's claims, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit concerned itself only with the claim against Strong. See Griffin, 983 F.2d
at 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
143. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1545. Steven Griffin and the Griffin's daughter, Angie, also
brought § 1983 claims. The jury found no violation of Steven's or Angie's constitutional
rights, so the only issues before the court on appeal concerned the violation of Dorothy
Griffin's rights. See id.
144. Id. at 1546.
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familial right of association is properly based on the 'concept of liberty in
the Fourteenth Amendment.' "145
The court of appeals characterized the right of familial association as
a "subset" of intimate association. 146 It then asserted that to determine
whether a violation of this right has occurred requires balancing the "lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests."1 47 The court articulated
the necessary weighing in terms of the facts before it.
[W]e must weigh two factors: the state's interests in investigating
reports of child abuse, which is the interest served by Strong's
conduct in investigating the claims against Steven Griffin, and
Dorothy Griffin's interest in her familial right of association. Ini-
tially, we examine these factors objectively, that is, outside of the
facts or subjective positions of the parties. Nonetheless . . .
[u] Itimately, we must examine the parties' interests in light of the
facts of this particular case.
148
Thus, the court purported to set up a two-part balancing test that evalu-
ated the asserted interests first objectively and then subjectively.
The court of appeals looked first to the state's overarching interest in
investigating potential child abuses. Based on the typically covert nature
of child abuse and society's well-founded disdain for such crimes, the
court placed great importance on the state's "traditional and 'transcen-
dent' investigatory interests" in protecting the welfare of children. 149 The
court recognized that " [t] he right to associate with one's family members is
a very substantial right."15 0 After establishing the individual importance
of these rights, however, the court of appeals made no effort to compare
their importance relative to each other.
15 1
Next, the court of appeals turned to the subjective portion of its test
and focused on "the facts surrounding the parties' interests." 152 The
court broke this analysis into two parts. First, it looked to Trujillo and as-
serted that for a defendant's behavior to become unconstitutional, it must
be directed "at the intimate relationship with knowledge that the state-
ments or conduct will adversely affect that relationship."15 3 Second, the
court indicated that it must "also examine the evidence to determine [1]
145. Id. at 1547 (quoting Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1989)).
146. Id. (citing Shondell v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 879, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1985)).
147. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court called this balancing "classic fourteenth amendment liberty anal-
ysis." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1548 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990)); see also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); State v. Jordon, 665 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah 1983), appeal
dismissed, 464 U.S. 910 (1983)).
150. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548 (citing Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1989)).
151. See id. But see id. at 1549 (court concludes the infringement of these important rights
is slight).
152. Id. at 1548.
153. Id. (citing Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190). The court does not indicate why it felt com-
pelled to retain the Trujillo First Amendment intent test after spending the first part of the
opinion explaining why familial association claims properly derive from the Fourteenth
Amendments' substantive due process protections. See id. at 1546-47. For further discussion
of the issue, see infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
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the severity of the alleged infringement, [2] the need for the defendant's
conduct, and [3] any possible alternatives."
1 54
The court began by presenting the evidence supporting Dorothy Grif-
fin's allegation that Strong directed his conduct at the spousal relationship
with knowledge that his conduct would adversely affect the relationship.
First, the defendant lied when he told Dorothy Griffin that her husband
had already confessed to child abuse.15 5 Second, the defendant doubted
Mrs. Griffin's morals when she told him that she did not believe her hus-
band committed child abuse.1 56 Third, during an interview in which
Steven Griffin finally confessed, the defendant told him that he had not
heard from his wife "because you won't confess to what you've done and
get the help that you need." 15 7 Fourth, the defendant encouraged Mrs.
Griffin to move to another state and start her life over.1 58 Fifth, Mrs. Grif-
fin testified that the defendant used her against her husband when she
tried to explain to Steven "she was told to leave him not help him."
15 9
The court of appeals next turned to the second half of its subjective
test and examined the "severity of the alleged infringement."1 60 Noting
that both Steven and Dorothy Griffin consensually talked to the defend-
ant, the court said that "consensual interviews are less likely to infringe on
familial interviews because the parties can always decline to talk." 16 1 The
court next asserted that Dorothy Griffin presented no evidence indicating
that the defendant acted with "physical coercion or conduct that shocks
the conscience." 162 The court conceded that Strong's lie to Dorothy Grif-
fin about her husband confessing to child abuse increased the severity of
the alleged infringement. 1 63 Although the court of appeals asserted that
additionally it would examine "the need for the defendant's conduct, and
any possible alternatives,"' 6 4 these examinations did not make it into the
court's opinion.'
65
After this analysis of the facts, the court of appeals concluded, amidst
scanty and elusive reasoning, that no reasonable juror could appropriately
balance the competing interests and determine that the defendant vio-
lated the plaintiff's rights.' 66 In support of this conclusion, the court sim-
154. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548.
155. Id. at 1549.






162. Id. at 1548-49 (citing Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
226 (1991)). In its prior familial association decisions, the Tenth Circuit had never indicated
that a showing of physical coercion or conduct that shocks the conscience is necessary to a
successful claim. See Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County SherifFs Dept., 905 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir.
1990); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); Archuleta v. McShan, 897
F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1990); Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.
1985).
163. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549 n.5.
164. Id. at 1548.
165. See id. at 1548-49.
166. Id. at 1549.
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ply stated, "on the balance, the infringement of familial rights of
association in this case is slight."1 6 7 Based on these findings, the court of
appeals remanded the case to the district court with a direction to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant, Officer Strong.
1' s
C. Analysis
While Griffin v. Strong169 might have ended the confusion concerning
the right of familial association's constitutional source,170 the resulting
modification of the law left familial association jurisprudence more per-
plexing than ever.17 The court of appeals' definitive placement of famil-
ial association among the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process protections led it to alter its legal analysis. 172 According to the
Supreme Court, determining if someone's Fourteenth Amendment liberty
rights have been violated requires balancing the claimed "liberty interests
against the relevant state interests."' 73 After noting that courts have ap-
plied this balancing test in intimate association cases,' 74 the Griffin court
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (court explicitly placed right of familial
association under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protection).
171. Although Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.
1985), created confusion with respect to the constitutional source of the right of familial
association, it is worth noting that the court of appeals' statement of the law lent itself to easy
application. In the three familial association cases heard by the Tenth Circuit since Trujillo
and prior to Griffin, the court applied the law with appreciable consistency. See Apodaca v.
Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1147 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing to reverse
dismissal of plaintiff's claim because no evidence of defendant's intent to interfere with the
plaintiff's protected relationship); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (10th
Cir. 1990) (upholdingjudgment for defendant because intent cannot be transferred and no
allegation of intent directed at family relationship); Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 498-
99 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasizing necessity of intent and that plaintiff be "deliberate object"
of conduct). Nor did the Tenth Circuit's district courts have much trouble applying the
court's Trujillo holding. See Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D.N.M.
1992) (granting motion to dismiss because plaintiff did not allege intent); Beck v. Calvillo,
671 F. Supp. 1555, 1557-58 (D. Kan. 1987) (granting summary judgment because no allega-
tion of intent); White v. Talboys, 635 F. Supp. 505, 507 (D. Colo. 1986) (motion to dismiss
denied because plaintiff alleged intent to interfere with particular family relationship); Trejo
v. Wattles, 636 F. Supp. 992,997 (D. Colo. 1985) (denying motion to dismiss because plaintiff
alleged intent directed at relationship). But see Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 832-33 (D.
Kan. 1992) (refusing to recognize right of family integrity based on Trujillo), affd, 997 F.2d
784 (10th Cir. 1993).
However, the Tenth Circuit's decision to place definitively the right of familial associa-
tion among the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest was a good one. The First Amend-
ment's protection of associational rights is ancillary to its protection of speech, religion, and
assembly. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). These rights do not
embrace the relationship shared by family members nearly as well as the right of intimate
association that has been recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process protections. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1984).
The court of appeals' decision to position the right of familial association as a subset of the
right of intimate association is also consistent with the Seventh Circuit's approach. See Griffin,
983 F.2d at 1547.
172. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547.
173. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
174. See id. at 1547.
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articulated its two part balancing test.175 The first part of the test, which
objectively examines the interests represented by each party, poses little
difficulty. 176 The problems arise primarily out of the second half of the
test, that part which requires courts to examine subjectively "the facts sur-
rounding the parties' interests."
1 77
The court of appeals broke this second prong into two stages of analy-
sis. First, it returned to the familiar Trujillo test and asserted that "to rise
to the level of a constitutional claim, the defendant must direct his or her
statements or conduct at the intimate relationship with knowledge that
the statements or conduct will adversely affect the relationship."1 78 Sec-
ond, the court claimed it would look at three things: the severity of the
alleged infringement, the necessity of the defendant's conduct, and any
alternatives to the defendant's conduct. The examinations into each of
these two prongs presents problems.
After categorically placing familial association among Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests, the court asserted that appropriately it
would apply a balancing test.1 79 However, the court called upon the Tru-
jillo test,180 an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind that admits to no
semblance of balancing. The court listed five allegations supported by the
record that taken together easily satisfied Trujillo.18 1 Oddly, the court of-
fered no explanation as to how the Trujillo standard fit into balancing "the
facts surrounding the parties interests."1 82 In light of the fact the court
decided in favor of Officer Strong, it is undeniable that it relied on some
counterbalance to Trujillo's satisfaction-intending to balance the Trujillo
inquiry against its subsequent examination into the severity of the alleged
infringement.
18 3
175. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
176. It can be argued the aspect of the test that asks the court to evaluate objectively the
interest of the plaintiff is redundant. By recognizing that familial association is a protected
liberty interest, the Tenth Circuit is already concluding that in the abstract relationships
between family members are important. The court's reason for including this objective
threshold test may be out of a felt need for a limitation on the types of familial relationships
that are protected. If this is the court's concern, then it should articulate absolute limita-
tions, not leave it up to a discretionary balancing test. For example, the Seventh Circuit has
categorically declined to recognize a protected relationship between siblings. See Bell v. Mil-
waukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
177. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1547.
180. Id. at 1548.
181. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text. By pulling from the record five sepa-
rate ways in which the defendant allegedly used Mrs. Griffin against her husband in an at-
tempt to get him to confess, the court all but conceded that Officer Strong's conduct
satisfied the Trujillo test.
182. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549.
183. Along with examining the severity of the alleged infringement, the court of appeals
also claimed that it would look into the necessity of the defendant's conduct and possible
alternatives to the conduct. The court made no attempt at the last two inquiries and offered
no explanation for this noticeable failure. See id. at 1548-49. Without becoming to specula-
tive, the argument can easily be made that deceptively using a wife against her husband to
secure his unwilling confession is not necessary to a child abuse investigation. Furthermore,
less egregious alternatives are probably available to the properly trained investigator.
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The court of appeals concluded the defendant only slightly infringed
on Dorothy Griffin's rights. 184 The court supported this conclusion by
looking to two considerations. First, the Griffins talked with officer Strong
consensually. 185 Second, no evidence suggested that Strong used "physi-
cal coercion or conduct that shocks the conscience." 186 The Tenth Cir-
cuit has never indicated that the presence of physical coercion or
conscience shocking conduct is an element of a successful familial associa-
tion claim. 187 The Tenth Circuit borrowed the notion that the defend-
ant's conduct must shock the conscience from Pittsley v. Warish,188 a First
Circuit decision.1 89 The court's reliance on Pittsey is improper.
In Pittsley, the First Circuit found that conduct which shocks the con-
science is only necessary when a plaintiff is unable to identify a specifically
recognized Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. 190 In Griffin, the
Tenth Circuit spent an entire section of its opinion explaining that famil-
ial association is included within the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
due process protections. 19 1 The court specifically characterized familial
association as a "subset" of intimate association. 192 Inexplicably, the court
of appeals held Dorothy Griffin responsible for an evidentiary showing
that is appropriate only when the plaintiff is unable to identify a specific
liberty interest.
The Tenth Circuit's reliance on Pittsley also becomes suspect in light
of the fact the First Circuit does not recognize familial association as a
protected right. Concerned with the possibility of an unlimited source of
claims, the First Circuit held in Pittsley that "only the person toward whom
the state action was directed, and not those incidentally affected, may
maintain a § 1983 claim." 193 There is something amiss when a court de-
nies a plaintiff relief under a recognized claim and then bolsters its hold-
184. Id. at 1549.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1990);
Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495
(10th Cir. 1990); Trujillo v. Board of County Commr's, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985).
188. 927 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991).
189. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549 (citing PittsIey, 927 F.2d at 9). The court does not indicate
where it got the idea that the presence of physical coercion is necessary to show a violation of
the right to familial association. The Pitisley opinion does not discuss physical coercion. See
Pittsley, 927 F.2d 3 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991).
190. Pitts/ey, 927 F.2d at 6 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)). The
First Circuit articulated two theories under which a plaintiff could proceed in a substantive
due process claim:
Under the first theory, it is not required that the plaintiffs prove a violation of a
specific liberty or property interest; however, the state's conduct must be such that
it "shocks the conscience." To succeed under the second theory, a plaintiff must
demonstrate a violation of an identified liberty or property interest protected by the
due process clause.
Id. (citations omitted).
191. See Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1546-47 (section III of the court's opinion).
192. Id. at 1547.
193. Pitts/y, 927 F.2d at 8. The First Circuit seems to define "those incidentally affected"
very broadly to mean all those who were not the primary victim of state action. See id. at 7-8;
Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1986).
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ing with precedent from a court that has refused to recognize that the
plaintiff's interest is even entitled to protection.
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that "no reasonable juror, when
confronted with balancing the interests on the record before us under the
appropriate standard, could determine" that Officer Strong unduly violated
Dorothy Griffin's right of familial association.19 4 This holding does not
satisfy because it strikes a sustained chord of injustice. The court's arrival
at this holding leaves the appropriate legal analysis nearly unintelligible.
Although a clear statement of the law proves elusive, important ideas
emerge. Even if a plaintiff satisfies the Trujillo test, the Tenth Circuit is
likely to approach a defendant's conduct with great deference unless it
amounts to physical coercion or is so egregious that it shocks the con-
science. Perhaps the most important lesson that can be gleaned from Grif-
fin is that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit does not favor the
right of familial association. A plaintiff has never prevailed on a familial
association claim at the appellate level in the Tenth Circuit,19 5 and the
court's jurisprudential gymnastics in Griffin v. Strong suggest that this tradi-
tion is likely to continue.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in the two speech cases exhibit a lauda-
ble recognition of the importance of speech in American society. The-
matic to both opinions is the idea that participants in a democratic society
can make proper decisions as to what is in their best interest only if they
are exposed to the full breadth of ideas. The court's decision in Griffin v.
Strong'9 6 suggests that the court of appeals may be having second thoughts
about its decision to recognize the right of familial association. The
court's confusing modification of the law combined with its opaque rea-
soning casts a pessimistic cloud over the likelihood of plaintiff success in
the future.
J Bartlett Johnson
194. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1549 (emphasis added). The court of appeals said that the trial
judge should have directed a verdict or granted a judgement N.O.V. Id. at 1549 n.6.
195. See Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir.
1990) (refusing to reverse dismissal of plaintiff's claim because no evidence of defendant's
intent to interfere with the plaintiff's protected relationship); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905
F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding judgment for defendant because intent can-
not be transferred and no allegation of intent directed at family relationship); Archuleta v.
McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 498-99 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasizing necessity of intent and that
plaintiff be "deliberate object" of conduct).
196. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
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